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I. Introduction
This paper examines whether the marginal investor correctly accounts for the biases in analyst earnings forecasts introduced by analysts' incentives. It has been empirically documented that analysts' opinions are reflected in stock prices. 1 Despite their influence, analysts often operate under incentives that are inconsistent with telling the truth. As less sophisticated consumers of analysts' opinions, retail investors might fail to make proper adjustments for the more nuanced of the resulting biases. 2 To the extent that arbitrage is limited, some of these biases might be reflected in market prices. 3 Thus, a study of analysts' incentives, resulting forecast biases and their potential impact on market prices will shed light on the scope of market efficiency.
Sell-side analysts are pressured to issue optimistic forecasts and recommendations for several reasons. First, their compensation is tied to the amount of trade they generate for their brokerage firms. Given widespread unwillingness or inability to sell short, more trade will result from a "buy" than from a "sell" recommendation. Second, a positive outlook improves the chances of analysts' employers winning investment banking deals. 4 Third, being optimistic has historically helped analysts obtain inside information from the firms they cover. 5 All of these pressures introduce an optimistic bias to analysts' views, the magnitude of the bias held in check by reputational 1 concerns. Ultimately, analysts' livelihoods, their ability to generate trades and attract investment banking business, depends on their credibility.
The tradeoff between career concerns and the pressure to be optimistic generates predictable patterns of forecast bias. In particular, optimistic forecast bias is increasing in the uncertainty of the underlying earnings. This bias has two components, one that analysts deliberately add to their private estimates, another that arises when sufficiently negative views are kept quiet. 6 Feeling less accountable in uncertain environments, analysts are inclined to issue more optimistic forecasts.
High uncertainty will generally lead to more spread out private signals about future earnings.
Analysts who receive a low private signal and choose to keep quiet will bias the mean of the reported forecasts further up. Thus, both components of optimistic bias, the one analysts add deliberately and the one due to self-selection, will be increasing in the underlying uncertainty and in the dispersion of the reported forecasts. 7 To empirically assess whether the marginal investor adjusts for this bias I construct predictors of the earnings surprises based on this theory and investigate whether they also forecast stock returns. I estimate the bias that arises due to self-selection in coverage based on the decrease in analyst following of a firm over the past three months. I further assume that the reported forecast distribution is a truncated normal and the absent analysts would have issued forecasts in the missing left tail of the distribution. I then compute the standard deviation of thus defined "true" forecast distribution and assume that it represents the underlying level of uncertainty. Interacting the decrease in coverage with dispersion in the outstanding forecasts captures the degree to how pessimistic the withheld opinions could have been. The estimate of the bias is a significant negative predictor of the future earnings surprise, with a coefficient close to one, implying that it correctly captures the magnitude of the bias. That the bias is also negatively related to abnormal returns around earnings announcement days suggests that the marginal investor does not adjust earnings forecasts for self-selection. Among the stocks in the highest quintile of forecast dis-persion, those that have experienced a decrease in analyst following over the past three months earned, on average, a 4.8% lower risk-adjusted annual return than the stocks with a nondecreased analyst following.
Another indication that the bias due to self-selection is factored into stock prices is that the right-skewed earnings forecast distribution is a negative predictor of earnings surprises and stock returns. Right-skewness of the forecast distribution indicates the absence of negative opinions among reported forecasts. Stocks in the highest skew-based quintile have outperformed the stocks in the lowest quintile by, on average, 2.76% per year on the risk-adjusted basis.
The profitability of the portfolio strategies documented here are closely related to other previously documented return anomalies, notably, price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) and earnings momentum (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) ). This relationship sheds some light on the mechanics of return predictability. In particular, it implies that investors do not interpolate information about the future earnings revisions and earnings surprises that is contained in past revisions and forecast dispersion. This paper shows that downward earnings revisions are gradual and predictable. In the beginning of the fiscal year, when earnings are still highly uncertain, analysts add a higher bias to their estimates, which is gradually revised down over the fiscal year. Additionally, the bias is more pronounced for stocks with higher forecast dispersion.
Not surprisingly, firms with initially high levels of forecast dispersion experience the most pronounced future downward forecast revisions. But these downward revisions are not sufficient to fully eliminate the optimistic bias. In fact, the optimistic error of the mean earnings forecast is increasing in the magnitude of the downward revision, implying that analysts are extremely reluctant to fully reflect bad news in their forecasts.
The strong relation between forecast dispersion and future earnings forecast revisions accounts for the fact that earnings momentum fully explains the profitability of the trading strategies based on forecast dispersion and estimated bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage. Price momentum explains about half of the profit. Since the low future stock returns are at least partly caused by analysts' unwillingness to report bad news, this result lends support to the hypothesis of Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) that negative momentum arises because bad news disseminates slowly.
The empirical findings described above suggest that the marginal investor does not fully adjust for the forecast biases due to self-selection in coverage and earnings uncertainty. 8 If the predictive power of dispersion on future returns is caused by bounded rationality, sophisticated investors should sell high-dispersion stocks. Among users of analysts' forecasts, institutional investors, in particular, mutual funds that engage in independent research, are better positioned to understand inherent biases. But due to short-selling restrictions mutual funds are able to sell only shares they already own. Moreover, they are able to correct mispricing only if they sell the stock in quantities sufficient to affect prices. I investigate whether institutional trades in response to dispersion affect dispersion's predictive ability on future returns. My finding that institutions, on average, reduce their holdings of a stock in response to increasing dispersion confirms the view that highdispersion stocks tend to be overpriced. For the subset of stocks for which the reduction in holdings has been significant dispersion has no predictive power on future returns, indicating that institutions corrected potential mispricing through trades. This is evidence that sophisticated investors play a correcting role in the stock market. 9 8 Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) document that dispersion is negatively related to future returns, although the authors offer a slightly different explanation for this phenomenon. They interpret analyst disagreement as indicative of disagreement among investors and invoke the Miller (1977) argument that in the presence of short-sale constraints stock prices will reflect the view of the more optimistic investors. When the disagreement is resolved, prices converge down to the fundamentals, earning low returns. In his intriguing paper, Johnson (2004) suggests that the phenomenon can be explained without invoking irrationality. He interprets dispersion in analysts' forecasts as a proxy for uncertainty in the underlying cash flows. Equity, which in the presence of debt has the payoff structure of a call option, increases in value with the uncertainty in the firm cash flows. To the extent that the cash flow risk is idiosyncratic it will be unpriced. Thus, the higher the uncertainty the lower will be the expected return on equity. As the uncertainty is resolved, equity falls in value and the required rate of return increases.
9 Sadka and Scherbina (2004) argue that high-dispersion stocks continue to be mispriced because arbitrage is costly. They show that high-dispersion stocks have significantly higher trading costs than otherwise similar stocks. One possible explanation for high trading costs is that the market maker perceives that some investors are better informed about how to aggregate analysts' opinions.
II. Data Description
Analysts' earnings forecasts are taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail History and Summary History datasets. The latter contains summary statistics on analyst forecasts, including mean, median, and standard deviation of the forecasts as well as information about the number of analysts making forecasts and the number of upward and downward revisions. These variables are calculated on (ordinarily) the third Thursday of each month.
The Detail History file records individual analyst forecasts and dates of issue. Each record also contains a revision date, that is, the date on which the forecast was last confirmed to be accurate.
The standard-issue Summary and Detail files have a data problem that makes them unsuitable for the purposes of this paper. 10 In the standard-issue datasets earnings per share forecasts are adjusted by I/B/E/S for stock splits and stock dividends since the date of the forecast in order to smooth the forecast time series. The adjusted number is then rounded to the nearest cent. For firms that had large numbers of stock splits or stock dividends earnings per share forecasts (and the summary statistics associated with earnings) will be reported as zero. These will also tend to be the firms that did well ex-post. Observations with the standard deviation of zero (and/or mean forecast of zero) will thus include firms that have earned high future returns (which is what is actually observed in the data). To avoid inadvertently using this ex-post information I rely on forecasts not adjusted for stock splits produced by I/B/E/S at my request.
Data on stock returns, prices, and shares outstanding are from the daily and monthly stock files of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The accounting data are from the merged CRSP/Compustat database, extended through fiscal year 2002. If less than three months has elapsed since the latest fiscal-year-end date, accounting data for the preceding year is used.
Book value of equity is calculated using Compustat annual data (including the Research file).
I use total common equity, if available, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit. If total common equity is not available I use shareholder's equity minus the value of 10 This problem was first reported in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) . preferred stock. For preferred stock I use redemption value, liquidating value, or carrying value in that order, as available. The book-to-market ratio is defined as the ratio of book value to market value of equity. The latter is calculated as the product of month-end share price and the number of shares outstanding.
Stocks with high dispersion tend to be smaller, possibly because smaller stocks are more opaque. After controlling for size, stocks with high dispersion tend to have higher analyst coverage, possibly because there is more demand for expert opinion when it is difficult to interpret available information. High-dispersion stocks tend to be value stocks that have done poorly in the past and have higher systematic risk. 11
To minimize the problem of bid-ask bounce I use stocks priced at no less than $5 per share.
Because I am interested in dispersion in analysts' earnings per share forecasts, I consider only stocks in the I/B/E/S database that are followed by at least two analysts. As of January 1981 the number of stocks priced above $5 per share and followed by at least two analysts at the intersection of I/B/E/S and CRSP was 1,239. Of these, 858 were in the lower nine NYSE marketcapitalization deciles. As of January 1983 the number of stocks at the intersection of I/B/E/S and CRSP priced above $5 per share and followed by at least two analysts had grown to 1,401. Of these, 962 were ranked in the lowest nine NYSE market-capitalization deciles. The numbers at the end of 1999 were 3,466, 2,525 in the lowest nine NYSE market capitalization deciles. At the intersection of the I/B/E/S, CRSP, and Compustat datasets the pattern is similar, although the total number of available observations is lower because Compustat contains only a subset of the stocks in CRSP. The number of stocks at this intersection priced above $5 per share and followed by at least two analysts grew from 1,049 in January 1981 to 1,178 in January 1983 and to 1,979 in December 1999. A more complete sample description is available in Table I of Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) . Although the data go back to 1976, the number of stocks in the I/B/E/S cross-section increases more than threefold between 1976 and 1983. I use data from January 11 Ciccone (2003) . "This inconsistency is due to the fact that companies were not required to report fully diluted EPS on a quarterly basis unless there was a significant (>3%) difference between it and the primary number. It was the same on an annual basis, but companies usually reported both numbers anyway. In 1983 it was our policy to carry the primary EPS number over to the fully diluted number when the fully diluted number was not reported. For IBM in 1983 this fully diluted number was not reported quarterly, but was annually, which would explain the inconsistencies."
Given this noise in the diluted reported earnings I convert analysts' forecasts to primary basis whenever I use comparisons with the realized earnings per share numbers.
Data on institutional holdings are from the Spectrum database. Spectrum collects quarterly data on stock holdings from the 13F reports institutions are required to file if their holdings exceed $100 million. I aggregate these holdings over all institutions to arrive at the institutional holdings number.
III. Analysts' Incentives and Forecasts
Because sell-side analysts are not paid directly by investors and historically depended on firm managements for inside information, their incentives are not always consistent with telling the truth. Analysts build influence and reputation on the accuracy of their earnings per share forecasts and usefulness of their buy/sell recommendations, but their compensation is based on the profits 7 they help generate for the brokerage firms that employ them. Consider the following quote from the article "Analyze This," published in the June 2001 issue of Smart Money Magazine. "At First Union and most other banks, research analysts' compensation is completely unrelated to their stock picking or their earnings estimates. ... The real money-their bonus-is determined by how much trading they bring in for the sales force and, more important, how much business they generate for the firm's investment bankers." Analysts care about their reputation to the extent that it can be deployed to generate trades and attract investment banking business. Due to widespread unwillingness or inability to sell short, analysts generate stock purchases more easily than sales. Incidentally, mutual funds, the client group with the ability to generate large trades, are precluded by regulation from selling short. Analysts therefore prefer to focus on stocks for which they can issue a "strong buy" or "buy" recommendation. McNichols and O'Brien (1997) observe that analysts usually initiate coverage of stocks about which they feel optimistic and drop coverage of stocks about which they feel pessimistic. The "unwritten rule number two" is: "go with the flow of other analysts rather than try to be contrarian." Both rules discourage freely reporting negative opinions.
Managers can pressure analysts who cover their firms to issue optimistic reports by denying access to inside information. Studies show that analysts' earnings forecasts contain private information in addition to a statistical model based only on public information. Not surprisingly, it is access to non-public information investors value most. 12 The Regulation "Fair Disclosure," adopted in October 2000 to make analysts more independent of management, forbids selective disclosure of information. But is has already failed in several instances. One is described in the These pressures notwithstanding, analysts are constrained from adding an arbitrarily high optimistic bias to their private estimates by fear of hurting their reputations with investors. Analysts will set the optimistic bias at an optimal point that balances the benefit of being upbeat against the cost to their reputations. If, in addition to being penalized for their forecast errors, analysts face an additional penalty (e.g., being cut off from the sources of inside information) for being too pessimistic relative to others, those with sufficiently low private estimates might decide to drop coverage altogether.
12 Institutional Investor, a firm that compiles annual analyst rankings, ranks access to management sixth out of thirteen valuable analyst attributes, ahead of accuracy of earnings estimates, written reports, stock selection, and financial modeling. 13 One must wonder how severe the conflict of interest might be for firms that pay analysts to cover them.
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A. A model of analysts' incentives
The historical earnings distribution is left-skewed. 14 Analysts forecast mean expected earnings. . An analyst derives utility from issuing optimistic forecasts, but is penalized for forecast errors.
Additionally, a high penalty, C, is exacted if an analyst forecast falls k standard deviations of the public signal below the mean of the public signal. (This penalty could, for example, represent the risk of being cut off from inside sources of information and losing one's livelihood.) If f is the 14 One possible explanation is that firms engage in earnings smoothing to avoid negative earnings and when that does not work, the negative earnings they report tend to be quite low. 15 According to recent accounting papers, such as that of Gu and Wu (2003) , analysts forecast median rather than mean earnings. But even then their earnings estimates should be normally distributed.
16 DeBondt and Thaler (1990) show that analysts overreact to news. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) show that analysts underreact to recent earnings. Finally, Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) document that analyst recommendations do not fully reflect the ability of stock-related characteristics to predict future returns. However, incorporating overreaction or underreaction will not substantially change the analysis.
reported earnings per share forecast and EPS the realized earnings per share, the utility function of the analyst is:
Analysts set their forecasts to maximize their expected utility function:
The optimal forecast depends on how high an analyst's private earnings estimate, E [EPS] , is relative to the point at which the penalty C is imposed:
The expected optimistic bias in an analyst's forecast is increasing in the level of uncertainty of the earnings estimate, σ (and, hence, the level of uncertainty of the public signal, σ 0 , since the two are proportional). 17 There are two reasons for the positive correlation between the optimistic forecast error and level of uncertainty. First, the optimal bias analysts add to their earnings estimates is increasing in the level of uncertainty of the public signal and, hence, the uncertainty of their estimates. Second, the component of the bias caused by self-selection in analyst coverage also increases in forecast uncertainty. Unreported low forecasts are likely to be lower relative to the true mean of the forecast distribution the more spread out the distribution, thus creating a positive relationship between the bias and dispersion of the reported distribution.
This intuition can be proved mathematically. The expected bias in a reported forecast can be calculated as:
(The expression is divided by Φ(−a/σ) to arrive at the probability density function of the reported forecast distribution, which is truncated at point a, addable to 1.) It can be shown that the expected bias in analysts' forecasts is increasing in the level of underlying uncertainty about analysts' earnings estimates, σ. 18
Given k sufficiently large that the cut-off point a below which analysts do not report their forecasts falls either below or slightly above the expected mean forecast, it can be shown that dispersion in the reported forecasts will be increasing in the level of forecast uncertainty, σ. The bias in the outstanding forecasts will thus also be increasing in the dispersion of the outstanding forecasts.
According to the model the bias in the outstanding forecasts has two components: one that analysts deliberately add to their private estimate, and one due to self-selection in analyst coverage. In the empirical analysis I estimate the second component of the bias based on how many (if any) analysts dropped coverage in the past three months. I back out the dispersion of the true forecast distribution (in case the reported forecast distribution is truncated due to self-selection) to proxy for the underlying level of uncertainty. are excluded from the sample, as are observations for which the absolute value of the forecast error is greater than 30% of book equity. This is done to exclude extreme outliers that might be attributable in part to I/B/E/S data errors.
B. Patterns of analyst forecasts
Portfolios are based on dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts and include only stocks with December fiscal year end. Portfolio D1 consists of stocks in the lowest dispersion-based quintile, D5 of stocks in the highest dispersion-based quintile. In the graphs in the left column portfolios are re-formed monthly. In the graphs in the right column portfolios are formed in February of each year and held until the end of the year.
As can be seen from the first panel, bias increases in portfolio dispersion as predicted by the model. As the quarterly earnings numbers come out during the fiscal year, the uncertainty surrounding annual earnings declines and with it the forecast dispersion (bottom panel). Dispersion declines faster for the portfolios formed in February and held for the entire year than for portfolios formed monthly. As dispersion declines, so does the optimistic forecast error. The average future forecast revision is more negative for stocks in the high-dispersion portfolio than for stocks in the low-dispersion portfolio, and the difference is statistically significant. (If the higher-than-usual magnitude of the future downward forecast revisions is unanticipated by the marginal investor, the stock price reaction will be negative.)
From the middle two graphs it can be seen that the highest and lowest forecasts are not distributed symmetrically around the ex-post realized earnings. In fact, even the lowest forecast tends to be slightly optimistic in the beginning of the fiscal year, more so for the lower-dispersion portfolios. This indicates that analysts add a deliberate bias to their estimates in the beginning of the fiscal year, expecting to revise their forecasts down during the year, or that very pessimistic analysts do not express their opinions, or a combination of both. 19
19 Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2001) hypothesized the former to be the case.
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C. Self-selection in analyst coverage and bias
A direct implication of self-selection in analyst coverage is that the fewer analysts that issue forecasts, the higher the optimistic error in the mean outstanding forecast. The number of missing analysts can be calculated in two somewhat related ways. 20 The first is to effect a cross-sectional comparison of analyst coverage at a given time. This method was first employed by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), who predicted analyst coverage for a given set of firm characteristics and took the deviations from the predicted number to be the missing (or excess) coverage. The second method is to use the time series variation in analyst coverage for a given firm to indicate missing coverage. Because the number of analysts issuing estimates is slightly lower at the beginning of the fiscal year, it is important to calculate changes in coverage within a fiscal year. The two methods should produce similar results. If the number of analysts has decreased in a time series, the cross-sectional results will likely indicate lower than normal coverage. When regressing the error of the mean forecast on the missing number of analysts, both methods produce a significant positive coefficient (which implies that the lower the relative coverage, the higher the optimistic error of the consensus forecast). 21
In the remainder of this paper I use the time series variation in analyst coverage to estimate the number of missing analysts. If the number of analysts following a firm this month is lower than the number of analysts following the firm three months ago but in the same fiscal year, I set the difference to be the number of missing analysts. Otherwise, it is set to zero.
I then estimate the bias in outstanding earnings per share forecasts implied by the number of missing analysts. I assume that the distribution of reported forecasts is a truncated normal and the amount of the bias caused by self-selection is equal to
where k is the point below which analysts will not report their forecasts, estimated by inverting the standard normal CDF, Φ(k) = missing reporting+missing , and σ True is the standard deviation of the true, not reported 20 Obviously, analysts might be stopping coverage of a firm because of a potential conflict of interest. But my calculations do not explicitly adjust for this possibility. 21 The results of these regressions are not reported.
14 distribution that is assumed to be truncated. The dispersion of the true distribution is estimated under the assumption that the observed distribution is a truncated normal, so the true dispersion is somewhat higher:
2 , where σ is the standard deviation of the reported distribution. Estimated bias is scaled by the book value of equity. Additionally, the estimates are scaled by the square root of the number of quarters remaining until the end of the fiscal year in order to allow comparisons across firms with different fiscal year ends. I also estimate bias using the alternative assumption that analysts who are no longer following the stock will have forecasted earnings lower by one cent than the currently lowest outstanding forecast. This method of estimation produces qualitatively similar results (not reported). Table I provides a sample description of estimated bias as well as of other variables used in the paper. As can be seen from the table, there are relatively few firm-quarter observations for which coverage has declined over the past three months. Even the 75th percentile of observations have no missing analysts and, therefore, zero estimated bias. I restrict the sample to observations with book equity values of at least $3 per share. But even then, the average earnings surprise (defined as the difference between actual annual earnings and the mean earnings forecast immediately preceding the earnings announcement day, scaled by book equity), is -1.87%. The distribution of earnings surprises is highly negatively skewed, consistent with evidence documented in the accounting literature and, at -0.15%, the median earnings surprise is much less negative. 22 The average forecast revision is negative, consistent with the Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) finding that analysts prefer to issue optimistic forecasts and revise them down gradually throughout the year. The forecast distribution is, on average, positively skewed (skew is defined as the difference between the mean and median outstanding forecast, scaled by book equity), implying that there usually are more optimistic than pessimistic forecasts.
The second part of Table I shows Pearson correlation coefficients between predictive variables. The positive correlation between estimated bias and dispersion in outstanding forecasts is not surprising, given that the formula used to estimate the bias defines it to be proportional to dispersion. Dispersion and the estimated bias are, on average, preceded by downward forecast revisions, which is consistent with the argument in the paper that both coincide with high initial optimistic bias in the forecasts that is gradually revised down. This is also consistent with evidence presented in Figure 1 . The negative correlation between estimated bias and the skew of the reported forecast distribution might seem inconsistent with the theory, but it may be due simply to the fact that very optimistic analysts would rather drop coverage than revise their forecasts down. Then a highly right-skewed distribution will have no prior decreases in coverage and, hence, a zero bias. Once the very optimistic analysts have dropped out, the positive skew will decline and the estimated bias take on a positive value. This mechanism would produce a negative correlation between skew and estimated bias. Remarkably, the average skew is positive for the observations with the positive estimated bias, which is consistent with the predictions of the model. Forecast uncertainty and the bias due to self-selection is more pronounced for smaller firms (which, presumably, are less transparent than larger firms). Finally, analyst disagreement is higher for value than for growth firms.
The third part of Table I breaks down the statistics based on changes in analyst coverage over the past quarter. The statistics are also calculated separately for two subperiods, 1983-1991 and 1992-2002 . Numbers show that decreases in coverage have become slightly more common in the later part of the sample (25% vs. 23% of firm-quarter observations) and the average number of analysts dropping coverage went up from 1.47 to 1.60. At the same time, the average estimated bias due to self-selection has decreased because forecast dispersion went down in the later part of the sample. Finally, since the universe of stocks covered by analysts has expanded over the years, analyst coverage for an average firm went down slightly. Consistent with predictions, decreases in coverage are accompanied by more negative forecast' revisions, indicating that they are associated with bad news. Table II reports results of regressing the earnings surprise on a set of predictive variables.
Only fourth quarter earnings forecasts immediately preceding the earnings announcement date are used in the regression. This regression is run using fiscal-year-end accounting variables.
The predictive variables used in the regression are: bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage; dispersion in analyst forecasts adjusted for the potential truncation of the reported distribution; revision in the mean annual forecast over the past quarter (with two additional variablesrevision − /revision + -equal in magnitude to revision if it is negative/positive and zero otherwise); logarithm of the firm market capitalization level; and book to market ratio. Because of the possible commonality in earnings surprises across firms regressions are run according to Fama and MacBeth (1973) specification. The sample period here, as in all subsequent regressions, is 1983-
2002.
Consistent with the model of analysts' incentives, both estimated bias and forecast dispersion are significant negative predictors of the earnings surprise. That revision of the mean forecast over the past quarter is a positive predictor of the earnings surprise suggests that analysts do not revise forecasts down enough in response to negative news. This can be seen more clearly when observations are broken into two subsamples, one with zero or negative and another with positive forecast revisions in the prior quarter. The second subsample is roughly half the size of the first one since analysts more often revise their forecasts down than up. In the first subsample (see the second panel of Table II ) the prior revision is a significantly positive predictor of the earnings surprise, which means that forecasts are more optimistic the more negative the prior forecast revision. This suggests that analysts underreact to bad news.
In the second subsample (see the third panel of Table II ) the forecast revision has no predictive power on the future earnings surprise, implying that analysts tend to reflect new information fully when responding to good news. When the prior-quarter earnings forecast revision is positive, it is consequently likely that the realized earnings outcome is better than the average expectation. Therefore, the missing negative opinions matter less, which explains why the level of significance of the estimated bias goes down. Dispersion becomes insignificant altogether. 23
IV. Do Investors Adjust for the Biases in Analysts' Forecasts?
In this section I investigate whether biases in analysts' forecasts find their way into stock prices and whether the marginal investor is able to disentangle forecasts from these inherent biases. It is plausible that investors adjust for some obvious types of bias but not for the ones that require more sophisticated analysis. For example, analysts' forecasts are, on average, optimistic. If investors did not adjust for this the average price reaction around earnings announcement days would be negative. But as seen in Table I it is, in fact, slightly positive. 24 More nuanced biases are not as easily detected. For example, recognition that analyst disagreement or diminished analyst coverage might engender optimistic bias relies on investor access to an historical crosssection of forecasts across firms and analysts. Retail investors, who most likely observe only one analyst forecast at a time, will find it difficult to estimate the magnitude of the bias that is correctly conditioned on the fact that a forecast has been issued. Institutions with access to research resources are better positioned than retail investors to determine and trade against the biases in analysts' forecasts.
In the following sections I document that biases in analyst forecasts, both deliberate as related to uncertainty and unintentional due to self-selection, are reflected in stock prices. 25 I also show that institutions, when they sell shares in response to dispersion in analyst forecasts, ameliorate the mispricing.
A. Evidence from returns around the earnings announcement days
Quarterly earnings announcements reveal a great deal about annual earnings. When investors' expectations diverge from reality the strongest price reaction should occur around the quarterly earnings announcement days. For firms with too high earnings expectations the price reactions should be negative.
I assume that all returns can be described by the market model with β = 1:
where r it and r mt are daily log-returns on an individual stock and the CRSP equally-weighted index, respectively. 26
Assuming day 0 to be the announcement date, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is estimated as: variables are included in the regression the coefficient on the estimated bias is negative and significant,−8.58 * 10 −2 , with the t-statistic -3.65, whereas dispersion is insignificant. This implies that prior to the earnings announcement prices reflect the bias in analysts' forecasts that is due to self-selection in coverage. When estimated bias is not included in the regression dispersion becomes negative and significant, which is not surprising given that the two are correlated. The prior forecast revision is positive and significant with the regression coefficient of 1.71 * 10 −2
and t-statistic of 8.12. When it is broken into positive and negative components the positive component also turns out to be significant. This likely means that investors underreact to analyst forecast revisions, whether positive or negative. Remarkably, the coefficient on the positive com-26 Brown and Warner (1985) find this model to perform adequately relative to more sophisticated models. 27 Because there may be a common component in stock returns not captured by the market factor, these regressions could be run according the Fama and MacBeth (1973) specification. The justification for running the regular OLS regressions is that returns are calculated only in the three-day windows around the earnings announcement days. Since earnings announcements are spread out, the hope is that the overlap in returns is minimal; in fact, the main results are robust to the Fama-MacBeth regression specifications. ponent is almost five times the magnitude of the one on the negative component. This is probably due to the fact that some investors are short-sale constrained and prices cannot react as quickly to negative compared to positive news, which would imply that the post-earnings-announcement drift would be more pronounced. 28 When the regression specification excludes estimated bias or dispersion the negative revision component gains in significance, implying that the two capture the tendency of the earnings forecasts to underreact to bad news. Skew in the outstanding forecasts is not significant and not included in any regression specifications. Finally, returns around earnings announcements tend to be higher for smaller stocks. This result is consistent with Chari, Jagannathan, and Offer (1988), who conjecture that for smaller firms that are less transparent most information becomes available at the time of the earnings announcements. This is when investors are exposed to and compensated for bearing the highest risk.
Panel B presents regression results for the two subsamples based on the sign of the priorquarter forecast revision. When earnings are uncertain and the recent forecast revisions are less than or equal to zero it is likely that the realized earnings will be lower than the average outstanding analyst opinion. Then the measure of the bias due to missing negative opinions will be significant. Indeed, the estimated bias due to self-selection in coverage is a significant negative predictor of returns, and so is forecast dispersion. When the prior-quarter earnings forecast revision is positive it is likely that the good outcome has been realized. This is why the bias due to self-selection becomes insignificant and dispersion-marginally positively significant. The fact that the forecast revision also predicts the price reaction on the announcement day indicates that investors underreact to positive forecast revisions.
Finally, Panel C presents results of the observations that have been windsorized: cumulative abnormal return observations that fall above or below the 5% tails of the return distribution have been assigned the values of the 5th and the 95th percentile observations respectively. In contrast to Panel A, estimated bias is now less significant than dispersion. This is possibly due to the fact 28 There is some evidence in the accounting literature that this is the case. 20 that estimated bias better predicts extreme negative price movements and forecast dispersion is better at capturing moderate negative price movements.
These regression results suggest that the marginal investor, on average, fails to adjust for the biases that arise due to analysts' tendency to issue more optimistic forecasts when earnings are uncertain and their preference for dropping coverage in response to negative signals.
B. Trading strategies
In this section I explore whether investors' failure to adjust forecasts for self-selection in analyst coverage can be profitably exploited. Table IV earn negative abnormal returns, thus producing positive returns on the strategy of buying lowdispersion and selling high-dispersion stocks. 31 The abnormal return of this strategy is highest for smaller stocks, 1.50% per month for the smallest size quintile, and insignificant for the largest size quintile. The return differential between low-and high-dispersion stocks in the entire I/B/E/S universe is 0.75% per month, on average. One of several reasons for this is that analysts produce more upwardly biased forecasts for smaller stocks (see Table II ) and investors assign more weight 29 I form my own size-based portfolios rather than sort based on the NYSE market capitalization deciles to obtain an equal number of stocks in each portfolio. Table III of Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) reports portfolio returns based on the NYSE market capitalization breakdowns. Remarkably, there are almost no stocks in the lowest three deciles and only 135 stocks in the fourth decile.
30 Returns here are equally-weighted, but value-weighting produces quantitatively similar results because stocks are pre-sorted by size.
31 Scherbina (2001) shows that a disproportionally large portion of future underperformance of high-dispersion stocks falls in the 3-day windows around quarterly earnings announcement days when most of the uncertainty about annual earnings is resolved.
to analysts' forecasts when forming valuations of smaller stocks because less information about them is available independently. Additionally, smaller stocks usually incur higher costs of shortselling, thus making it difficult for rational investors to arbitrage away the mispricing. Table V documents that a trading strategy based on self-selection in analyst coverage also produces abnormal returns. The bias in the mean outstanding forecast is estimated according to the first method (which assumes that the observed distribution of forecasts is a truncated normal and that analysts who stopped coverage within the past three months will have issued forecasts within the missing region of the distribution). 32 Stocks are sorted into five size-based groups and then into three bias-based portfolios. As most observations do not exhibit decreased analyst coverage within the past three months, most firm-date observations fall into the zero-bias portfolio. Returns for smaller firms are biased slightly up since I require that a firm be present in the I/B/E/S database one month before returns are calculated. Were all analysts to drop coverage the firm might still experience low future returns, but will not show up in the portfolio. Consequently, for smaller firms there are fewer observations with estimated bias (28, on average, over the time period). The number of stocks in the positive-bias portfolio is increasing with size, up to 63 stocks per portfolio, on average, for the highest size portfolio. As can be seen from the table portfolios of stocks with the highest estimated bias earn negative abnormal returns. Returns on high-bias stocks increase with size but, unlike dispersion-based sorting, remain significant even for stocks in the largest size quintile.
To show that bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage has predictive power on returns after controlling for forecast dispersion, I sort stocks independently into five dispersion-based groups and groups with zero and positive estimated bias. Table VI presents portfolio returns. As expected, self-selection in analyst coverage leads to high bias and, hence, low future returns only when the level of analyst disagreement is high as only then will the missing opinions deviate significantly from the reported mean. Positive-bias portfolios earn significantly lower returns for the two highest, but not the three lowest, dispersion-based groups. Estimated bias therefore has 32 Estimating bias according to the second method produces a similar result.
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predictive power on future returns independently of the level of forecast dispersion. A portfolio of stocks with high forecast dispersion and for which analyst coverage has declined over the past few months earns the lowest returns.
B.1. Evidence based on skewness in forecast distribution
This section provides further corroboration for the hypothesis that missing negative opinions are responsible for low future stock returns. 33 When negative opinions are missing because relatively pessimistic analysts have dropped coverage or further biased up their forecasts, the reported forecast distribution will be right-skewed. A measure based on skewness in analysts' forecasts will therefore predict the forecast error of the mean outstanding forecast and future low stock returns. This is, indeed, the case in the data.
I measure skewness as the difference between the mean and median forecast scaled by the book value of equity. At the beginning of each month I sort stocks at the intersection of the I/B/E/S Summary File and the CRSP dataset, with outstanding forecasts by at least three analysts, into five size groups and further into five skewness groups with both size and skewness measured as of the end of the previous month. Table VII shows average monthly returns on the equally-weighted portfolios formed this way. It can be seen from the table that portfolios with positive skewness in the forecasts earn negative abnormal returns in the smallest and third smallest size quintiles. For the entire universe the quintile of stocks with the highest (positive) skewness underperforms the quintile of stocks with the lowest (negative) skewness by, on average, 0.23% per month.
B.2. Relation to price and earnings momentum
A natural question is how the portfolio strategies described here are related to the previously documented return anomalies, in particular, price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 33 I thank Richard Thaler for suggesting this test. earnings momentum (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) ). Understanding these relationships will help us, to paraphrase Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) , trace the sources of predictability of future stock returns.
I construct four zero-cost portfolios based on the strategies described in the earlier sections.
D1-D5, the return on the equal-weighted portfolio that is long stocks in the lowest and short stocks in the highest forecast dispersion-based quintiles, is constructed in the same way as in Table IV . zero-bias−high-bias is the return on the equal-weighted portfolio that is long stocks with zero estimated bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage (in other words, stocks with no decline in analyst coverage over the past three months) and short stocks in the higher half of the estimated bias distribution. It is constructed as in Table V . zero-bias x D1−positive-bias x D5, the return differential between equal-weighted positions in the stocks in the lowest dispersionbased quintile with zero estimated bias and the highest dispersion-based quintile with a positive estimated bias, is constructed as in Table VI . Finally, Skew1-Skew5, the return on the portfolio that is long stocks in the lowest and short stocks in the highest quintiles based on the skew of the forecast distribution, is constructed as in Table VII . The price momentum and the three factors used in Fama and French (1992) -market, size, and value-vs.-growth -are downloaded from Kenneth French's web site. I compute the earnings momentum returns by forming an equalweighted portfolio that is long stocks in the highest decile and short stocks in the lowest decile based on the change in the mean earnings forecast for the current fiscal year over the past six months, as described in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) .
Regression results are reported in Table VIII . Results indicate that price momentum is a significant variable that substantially increases the explanatory power of the regressions. Though it helps lower the alphas of the strategies, it does not completely eliminate their significance. On the other hand, earnings momentum completely explains the profitability of all the strategies, with the exception of the one based on skewness of the forecast distribution. 34 This evidence helps us understand the origins of earnings momentum. By biasing up forecasts for firms with uncertain and declining earnings and withholding negative information through silence analysts create optimistic expectations that end up gradually corrected down in the future.
Thus, negative forecast revisions lead to more future negative revisions and low stock returns.
This evidence also sheds light on the mechanics of negative price momentum. In support of the argument of Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) that the underperformance of momentum losers arises because negative information disseminates into the market slowly I show here that analysts' preference for keeping quiet rather than reporting negative news impedes negative information from quickly reaching the market.
V. Does the Presence of Sophisticated Investors Ameliorate Mispricing? Evidence from Institutional Holdings Data
As conjectured by Miller (1977) and Viswanathan (2001) , the optimistic bias in stock prices will be lower the less constrained pessimistic investors are from selling shares. Institutions, being on average a more sophisticated class of investors, are more likely to understand when highdispersion stocks are overpriced. Because some institutions, in particular, mutual funds, are prohibited by regulators from selling short they will be able to influence prices only if they own sufficient shares to begin with and are free to substantially reduce their holdings in response to mispricing (which will not be the case for index funds). If institutions are able to sell sufficient shares, mispricing will be corrected and dispersion will not predict future returns. To see if this is the case I check the predictive power of dispersion on future returns dependent on whether institutions as a group have historically traded against dispersion in analysts' forecasts.
I calculate total institutional ownership, Instit it , of stock i at time t by summing individual holdings recorded quarterly on SEC 13F reports and divide the result by the total number of shares outstanding to arrive at the fraction held by the institutional sector. I quantify how this fraction responds in a time series to predictors of institutional ownership such as dispersion and price momentum. For each stock i I run the following quarterly time-series regression:
where σ it is the standard deviation in analysts' earnings per share forecasts scaled by the book value of equity and the square root of the number of months remaining until the fiscal year end, and ret3mo is the average stock return over the past three months, included to control for price momentum.
Coefficient β 1i captures the degree to which institutional ownership responds to changes in analyst forecast dispersion for firm i. Theory suggests that if institutional ownership responds negatively to dispersion (i.e., if β 1i is significantly negative) mispricing should be ameliorated.
Such stocks should not earn as low risk-adjusted returns as stocks with nonnegative sensitivity of ownership to dispersion (β 1i ≥ 0).
To check whether this is the case in the data I sort all stocks at the intersection of Spectrum (the dataset of SEC 13F report filers), the I/B/E/S Summary File, CRSP, and Compustat into three groups based on the p-value of coefficient β 1i of regression (7). I then sort the stocks independently into five groups based on dispersion in analyst forecasts as of the previous month, defined in the usual way. Resulting portfolio returns are equally-weighted. 
VI. Discussion
As discussed in the introduction, there are several plausible explanations for why dispersion forecasts returns. Johnson (2004) argues that it is a rational phenomenon. When a firm is levered equity has the payoff structure of a call option. The value of a call option will be increasing in the uncertainty of the firm's cash flows, which is captured by dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts.
If this uncertainty is idiosyncratic it will not be priced in, lowering the expected returns on equity.
When the uncertainty is resolved equity will earn low returns.
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) conjecture that analyst disagreement predicts future underperformance because it proxies for differences of opinion among investors. When pessimistic investors are short-sale constrained optimists end up driving up stock prices to reflect their own valuations and in the future prices fall as the uncertainty is resolved. In this paper I argue that analyst disagreement leads to low future returns because it is correlated with the upward bias in analysts' earnings forecasts that is mistakenly incorporated into stock prices. These arguments are similar in that they rely on the marginal investor being optimistic for whatever reason and rational investors being unable to sell the stock and correct the mispricing. 36, 37 35 Viswanathan (2001) sorts stocks based on responsiveness of short interest to dispersion and finds that the returns differential between the high-and low-dispersion stocks is lower for the group of stocks with a higher responsiveness coefficient. I repeat the same exercise by estimating the responsiveness of total institutional holdings and the breadth of institutional ownership to dispersion and obtain a similar result: when institutions trade in response to increased dispersion the return differential is less pronounced.
36 Another plausible conjecture is that analysts are slow to revise their forecasts down in response to bad news, thus causing dispersion in analysts' forecasts, a downward drift in forecast revisions, and a positive earnings surprise in the future. This concern has been addressed in Scherbina (2001) , who shows that even when only the most recent forecasts, issued in the past 30 days, are considered dispersion still forecasts future returns. 37 The interaction between leverage and dispersion documented in Johnson (2004) is also consistent with investors' irrational overpricing of firms with high analyst dispersion. According to the second proposition of Modigliani and Miller, the required return on equity increases with leverage. When investors irrationally overprice equity they underestimate leverage and thus the required rate of return. When the equity value converges to fundamentals
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The results here are consistent with the notion that at least part of the predictive power of dispersion derives from its correlation with forecast bias. The estimate of the bias that is due to self-selection in analyst coverage is positively correlated with dispersion. As evidenced by Table III , it predicts returns even in the presence of dispersion as a control variable. Additionally, the prior-quarter forecast revision subsumes the predictive power of dispersion. One possible explanation is that it is a better predictor of the earnings surprise.
That the negative relationship between forecast dispersion and returns is not a fully rational phenomenon is evidenced by institutional investors trading against it. For stocks for which institutional response to dispersion has been significant the mispricing appears to have been eliminated. A natural follow-up question is why do institutions sell some overpriced stocks but not others? Several explanations seem plausible. Institutions might be required to hold certain stocks that are part of an index. Other stocks might be highly illiquid such that the price concession institutions will pay for selling them will exceed the expected price decline. It is also plausible that the institutions that hold on to overpriced shares are less sophisticated (i.e., as opposed to mutual funds). Further investigation is required to evaluate these possibilities.
The question of why mispricing has not been fully eliminated is addressed by Sadka and Scherbina (2004) , who claim that it is due to the endogenously high costs of arbitrage. When analyst disagreement is high, the market maker is informationally disadvantaged with respect to some investors about how to aggregate analysts' views. She will consider order flow to be informative of the true value of the stock and adjust the price in the direction of the trade. 38 The authors document that high-dispersion stocks have significantly higher costs of trade than lowdispersion stocks, even after controlling for size and momentum. Thus, analyst disagreement leads to an upward bias in forecasts misleading some investors into forming high valuations, but also resulting in high trading costs that render arbitrage unprofitable.
investors learn about the actual leverage and demand a higher rate of return. Thus, underperformance should be more pronounced for more levered firms.
38 See the Kyle (1985) model for the determinants of trading costs.
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VII. Conclusion
When the level of analyst disagreement about future earnings is high the average forecast tends to be overly optimistic. I hypothesize that this happens for two reasons. First, high analyst disagreement usually coincides with high uncertainty, which makes analysts less accountable for errors in their forecasts and encourages adding a higher bias to their private estimates. Second, if some analysts with low private estimates cease coverage the upward bias in the reported forecast will be higher the lower the unreported forecasts are relative to the truth, which would be the case when the underlying forecasts are highly dispersed.
I show dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts to be a significant predictor of the earnings surprise and the price reaction around earnings announcement days. I further compute a proxy for the bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage by estimating the number of missing analysts and placing their collective forecast somewhere below the mean. Two different methods of estimating this bias produce similar results. Both are reliable predictors of the future earnings surprise, price reaction around earnings announcement days, and returns throughout the fiscal year. Rightskewness in the reported forecast distribution, which is another indicator that pessimistic opinions are missing from the forecast distribution, turns out to be a significant predictor of future returns as well.
These results indicate that the marginal investor, on average, fails to adjust analysts' earnings forecasts for inherent biases. When I check whether the resulting mispricing is ameliorated when sophisticated investors trade against it, I find this to be the case. When institutions, a more sophisticated class of investors with access to independent earnings forecasts, trade against the dispersion in analysts' forecasts dispersion loses its predictive power on future returns. This finding suggests a beneficial effect of sophisticated investors on market efficiency. Table I Sample Description
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent two regressions. To be included in the regressions a firm-date observation must be present at the intersection of I/B/E/S, CRSP, and Quarterly Compustat. The time period is 1983-2002. Annual earnings surprise is defined as the realized annual earnings per share minus the mean forecasted number, scaled by the book value of equity as of the end of the previous fiscal year (only fourth-quarter numbers are reported). Cumulative abnormal return around the earnings announcement date is calculated as the mean difference between the return on the stock and the return on the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio from one day before to one day after the earnings announcement day. bias is bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage, estimated under the assumption that if the number of analysts following the stock decreased since the previous quarter the distribution of the reported forecasts is a truncated normal and the bias is equal to
where k is the point below which analysts will not report their forecast, estimated as
and σ is the standard deviation of the true, not reported, distribution. Dispersion is then defined as σ; both bias and dispersion are estimated based on the latest available forecasts before the announcement date and are scaled by book equity and the square root of the number of quarters remaining until fiscal year end in order to facilitate comparison across quarters of a fiscal year. Past-quarter forecast revision is the difference between the latest mean forecast preceding the earnings announcement day and the mean forecast three months ago, scaled by book equity. Skew of the forecast distribution is defined as the difference between the mean and the median forecast scaled by book equity. Market capitalization is the dollar value of all common equity as of the last annual report. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity as of the last annual report. Book equity is defined as the Compustat book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, I use redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. The observations used in the regressions are required to have at least three outstanding analysts' forecasts and book value of equity of at least $3 per share. (1973) method. These variables are: bias is bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage, estimated under the assumption that if the number of analysts following the stock decreased since the previous quarter, the distribution of the reported forecasts is a truncated normal and the bias is equal to
Descriptive Statistics
where k is the point below which analysts will not report their forecast, estimated as Φ(k) = missing reporting+missing , and σ is the standard deviation of the true, not reported, distribution; dispersion is defined as σ; past-quarter revision, is the change in the mean outstanding annual earnings forecast over the past three months; revision + /revision − are variables equal to revision if it is positive/negative and zero otherwise; skew is the skew of the forecast distribution, defined only if there are more than two forecasts outstanding (dispersion, bias, revision and skew are scaled by book equity as of the last annual report); ln(ME), the logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, and ln(BE/ME), the logarithm of the ratio of the firm book value of equity to the market value of equity, both as of the latest available annual report. 
Predictors of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Quarterly Earnings Announcement Days
Cumulative abnormal return is defined as the average stock return net of the equal-weighted market return in a three-day window around the earnings announcement day (in per cent). The table reports coefficients of regressing cumulative returns on various predictive variables; the intercept coefficient is not reported. The predictive variables are: bias is bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage, estimated under the assumption that if the number of analysts following the stock decreased since the previous quarter the distribution of the reported forecasts is a truncated normal and the bias is equal to
where k is the point below which analysts will not report their forecast, estimated as Φ(k) = missing reporting+missing , and σ is the standard deviation of the true, not reported, distribution; dispersion is defined as σ; past-quarter revision, is the change in the mean outstanding annual earnings forecast over the past three months; revision + /revision − are variables that are equal to revision if it is positive/negative and zero otherwise (dispersion, bias and revision are scaled by book equity as of the last annual report); ln(ME), the logarithm of the firm's market value of equity; and BE/ME, the ratio of the firm's book value of equity to the market value of equity, both as of the latest available annual report. Book equity is defined as the Compustat book value of stockholders' equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available) minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, I use redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. The observations are required to have the book value of equity of at least $3 per share. Adjusted R 2 is reported in per cent.
Panel A: All observations (123,495 observations) past-quarter bias dispersion revision revision − revision + ln(ME) BE/ME R 2 ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −3 ) ( * 10 −3 ) (%) 
Windsorized sample (values of the cumulative abnormal return that fall below 5% and above 95% of the return distribution are assigned the values of the fifth and the ninety-fifth percentiles, respectively) past-quarter bias dispersion revision revision − revision + ln(ME) BE/ME R 2 ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −2 ) ( * 10 −3 ) ( * 10 −3 ) (%) the current fiscal year, scaled by the book value of equity as of the latest available annual report (previous year's book equity is used for the first quarter of the fiscal year). To facilitate comparison across firms with different months' fiscal year end, both estimated bias and dispersion are divided by the square root of the number of months remaining until the announcement month of annual earnings (this method assumes that signals about annual earnings are evenly spread and independent across months). Portfolios are formed every month and stocks in the portfolios held for one month. The observations used are required to have at least three outstanding analysts' forecasts, book value of equity of at least $3 per share, and stock price of at least $5 per share; t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation. the current fiscal year decreased from three months ago, the analysts who dropped coverage would have forecasted a number somewhere below the truncation point, according to the normal distribution. Truncation point, k, is estimated as
Returns
reporting+missing . The bias is equal to
where σ is the standard deviation of the true, not the reported, distribution. This number is then scaled by the firm's book value of equity and, to facilitate comparison across firms with different months' fiscal year end, divided by the square root of the number of months remaining until the announcement month of annual earnings (this method assumes that signals about annual earnings are evenly spread and independent across months). Portfolios are formed every month and held for one month. Forecasts for the second, third, and fourth month of the fiscal year are not considered because it is not possible to calculate drop in coverage in the beginning of the fiscal year.
Only observations with book value of equity of at least $3 per share and stock price of at least $5 per share are considered; t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation. 
Portfolio Returns as a Function of Truncation Bias and Dispersion
The left table reports alphas of the Fama-French three-factor model for the time period July 1983-December 2002. The stocks are sorted first by dispersion and then within each dispersion group by estimated bias in the current year's analyst earnings forecasts. Estimated bias is calculated under the assumption that if the number of analysts forecasting earnings for the current fiscal year decreased from three months ago, the analysts who dropped coverage would have forecasted a number somewhere below the truncation point, according to the normal distribution. Truncation point, k, is estimated as
where σ is the standard deviation of the true, not the reported, distribution. Dispersion is calculated as the standard deviation in analysts' current year's earnings-per-share forecasts scaled by book value of equity (only observations with at least three outstanding analysts' forecasts are considered). To facilitate comparison across firms with different fiscal year ends, both estimated bias and dispersion are scaled by the square root of the number of months remaining until the announcement month of the annual earnings announcement day (this method assumes that signals about annual earnings are evenly spread and independent across months). Portfolios are formed every month and held for one month. Forecasts for the second, third, and fourth month of the fiscal year are not considered because it is not possible to calculate the drop in coverage at the beginning of the fiscal year. Only observations with the book value of equity of at least $3 per share and stock price of at least $5 per share are considered; t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation. 
Returns
Skewness in Analyst Forecasts and Portfolio Returns
The left table reports alphas of the Fama-French three-factor model for the time period July 1983-December 2002. The stocks are sorted first by size and then by skewness of outstanding analyst earnings per share forecasts. Skewness is defined as the difference between the mean and median of the outstanding earnings per share forecasts scaled by the book value of equity as of the latest available annual report (previous year's book equity is used for the first quarter of the fiscal year). To facilitate comparison across firms with different months' fiscal year ends, the skewness measure is divided by the square root of the number of months remaining until the announcement month of annual earnings (this method assumes that signals about annual earnings are evenly spread and independent across months). Portfolios are formed every month and stocks in the portfolios held for one month. The observations used are required to have at least three outstanding analysts' forecasts, book value of equity of at least $3 per share, and stock price of at least $5 per share; t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation. 
Returns
Interaction with Price and Earnings Momentum
The table report alphas and factor loading of portfolio returns on the three factors of Fama and French (1992) (market (Market), size (SMB), and book-to-market (HML)), price momentum (calculated as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ) and earnings momentum factor (computed as in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) based on the rolling earnings forecast revisions over the past six months). D1-D5 is the return differential between stocks in the lowest and highest quintiles based on dispersion in the outstanding earnings forecasts, constructed as in Table IV .
zero-bias−high-bias is the return differential between the stocks with zero estimated bias due to self-selection in analyst coverage and stocks in the upper half of the estimated bias-based distribution, constructed as in Table V . zero-bias x D1−positive-bias x D5 is the return differential between stocks in the lowest dispersion-based quintile with zero estimated bias and the highest dispersion-based quintile with high estimated bias, constructed as in Table VI . Skew1-Skew5 is the return differential between stocks in the lowest and highest quintiles based on the skew of the forecast distribution, constructed as in Table VII 
Institutional Trades and Portfolio Returns
The left table reports alphas of the Fama-French three-factor model for the time period July 1983-December 2002. The stocks are sorted independently based on sensitivity of intitutional ownership to dispersion in analysts' forecasts and dispersion. Dispersion is calculated as the standard deviation in all outstanding analyst forecasts scaled by the book value of equity and the square root of the number of months remaining to the annual earnings announcement (the last scaling is done to facilitate cross-sectional comparisons across stocks with different months' fiscal year end and assumes that an equal amount of uncertainty about annual earnings is resolved every month). Institutional ownership is calculated by summing the quarterly holdings of all SEC 13F report filers. Sensitivity of institutional ownership of stock i to dispersion is defined as the coefficient it is the average stock return for the past three months. At least five quarterly observations are required to be included in the sample. Given β 1i statistically significant with a probability of 5%, if it has a negative sign it is classified as a "sell," if a positive sign, a "buy," and if it is insignificant at the 5% level it is classified as a "hold." Stocks are sorted independently into five groups based on dispersion in analysts' earnings per share forecasts. There are 15 portfolios total. Portfolio returns are equally-weighted. Stocks are reassigned into dispersion portfolios every month, Stocks with share prices of less than $5 and book equity values of less than $3 per share are excluded from the portfolios; t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation. 
Returns
